As President Joe Biden gears up for his highly anticipated visit to Angola from October 13 to 15, 2024, this marks a pivotal moment in his presidency—his first trip to an African nation. It is also significant as the first by a sitting U.S. president since Barack Obama traveled to Kenya and Ethiopia in 2015. This visit underscores the growing attention Africa is receiving from global powers and reflects the geopolitical shifts and the continent’s wealth of minerals that are crucial for electric vehicles and battery technologies.
The timing of Biden’s visit is critical, coming just ahead of the November 5 U.S. elections as his presidency approaches its final stages. In a meeting with Angolan President João Lourenço at the White House in November 2023, Biden emphasized Africa’s importance, declaring, “No country is more important than Angola.”
Angola’s historical ties have often leaned toward Russia and, more recently, China. The ruling People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) fought for independence from Portugal, and after gaining independence in 1975, it was mired in a civil war, receiving support from the Soviet Union and Cuba, while its rivals had backing from the U.S. and apartheid South Africa. Today, Russia continues to be a key arms supplier to Angola.
Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, a politics professor at the University of Oxford, points out that U.S. oil companies, particularly Chevron, have long been significant contributors to Angola’s budget, even before the collapse of the Soviet Union. “Angola’s relationship with the United States has been complex over the years, marked by both rocky moments and cooperation,” he explained.
China’s engagement with Angola has also centered around oil. Chinese banks have committed $46 billion to Angola since 2000, constituting about a quarter of their overall lending to Africa, according to Boston University data. However, with many infrastructure projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative falling short of expectations, their focus is shifting towards smaller, greener investments and the extraction of critical minerals. In response, the U.S., EU, UAE, and others are racing to catch up.
Vital minerals like copper and cobalt can be found in abundance in Angola’s neighboring countries such as Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A key U.S. and EU initiative to secure these supplies is the Lobito Corridor, aimed at upgrading a railway that runs approximately 1,000 miles from Kolwezi in the DRC’s copperbelt to the Lobito port. Plans are afoot to build new connections to Zambia and, eventually, to infrastructure leading through Tanzania to the Indian Ocean. It’s still unclear whether these efforts will entail partnership or competition with China, which previously committed to enhancing the infrastructure of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) that it financed in the 1970s.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently announced that the U.S. Development Finance Corporation has allocated $250 million, with total contributions from all partners reaching $4 billion. “The U.S. is eager to catch up with China, and this project is a key avenue for doing so,” remarked Paula Cristina Roque, an expert in Angolan politics.
The U.S. is also aware of Angola’s role in promoting peace in the conflict-ridden DRC and is keen to strengthen ties with African nations that are increasingly distancing themselves from American influence amid global conflicts, including Russia’s actions in Ukraine and ongoing crises in Gaza and Lebanon. “Angola, once a strategic ally for Russia and China, has now shifted its focus toward the U.S. sphere of influence,” she stated.
Judd Devermont, who previously served as Biden’s special assistant for Africa, warns against viewing U.S.-Angolan relations solely through a lens of competition with China. “That perspective is incomplete,” he argued, noting that, while minerals play a role, they do not fully define U.S. policy. “It’s about opportunity. President Lourenço has expressed a clear desire to deepen ties with the U.S. and Europe.”
Since taking office in 2017, Lourenço—a former general educated in the Soviet Union—has shown an openness to foreign investment. However, the growing discontent among Angola’s young population over job creation presents challenges for his administration. Following the contentious 2022 national elections, there have been noticeable shifts towards the West, along with increased repression of political dissent.
Angolan journalist José Gama, currently based in South Africa, expressed disappointment in the U.S. approach. “We had expected Biden to advocate for human rights in Angola,” he remarked, reflecting on the hopefulness surrounding Biden’s commitment to combating authoritarianism as outlined in a significant speech shortly after his inauguration in 2021.
Looking ahead, as Kamala Harris positions herself for a potential presidency depending on the election outcome, her foreign policy has not diverged much from Biden’s. She emphasized during her campaign that “America, not China, must lead the competition for the 21st century.” On her visits to Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia last year, she underscored Africa’s increasing importance.
Former President Donald Trump, a Republican candidate this election cycle, has voiced strong criticisms of China, yet his transactional approach raises questions about how he might view the Lobito Corridor if he were to return to power.
Ultimately, for many African governments, including Angola, the goal is to maximize the advantages of the increasing international interest. “Angola’s ambitions are quite conventional—they aim to forge as many partnerships as possible to leverage their relationships,” Soares de Oliveira concluded. “They prefer not to have to choose sides.”